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The Dormant Clause: How the Failure of the Repugnancy Clause Has Allowed for 
Discrimination against Women in Zambia 
 
Pamela Amaechi and Erica Mildner 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Zambia’s legal system combines unwritten customary law with post-colonial statutory law. 
However, select traditions clash with statutes promoting gender equality. Though the 
repugnancy clause promotes the supremacy of written law in discrimination cases, it has not 
been utilized effectively. This paper raises the sources behind the clause’s rare application and 
explores the possibility of utilizing the equal protection legal strategy employed by Botswana 
to prevent sex discrimination under customary law. This paper is based on a study of existing 
literature on the repugnancy clause in Southern Africa. Interviews were held with Boma and 
Chelstone Local Court Magistrates, as well as senior Local Court officials, women’s legal 
advocacy NGOs, and individual researchers.  This research was conducted in Lusaka, Zambia 
during June and July 2013.  
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
On 3 September 2013, the Botswana High Court struck down a customary practice that 
denies women equal inheritance rights with men.  Other Southern African countries have 
begun to “grapple with the conflict between the rights of women in customary law and the 
rights granted to women in common law and post-independence constitutions” (Botswana 
Court Decision a Victory for Women’s Rights, 2012). Such conflict is exhibited currently in 
Zambia, where domestic and international legislation ensuring equal treatment among the 
sexes has failed to garner equality for women. This problem can be traced back to the failed 
implementation of the repugnancy clause, the provision of the Zambian constitution that 
dictates the boundary between customary and statutory law. The repugnancy clause, 
located in the Local Courts Act (1991) outlaws any customary law that is “repugnant to 
natural justice or morality or incompatible with the provisions of any written law” (Local 
Courts Act, §12, cl.1.a). While Zambia’s Supreme Court has yet to rule definitively on when 
the repugnancy standard applies in cases of sex discrimination, the Botswana High Court’s 
ruling on 3 September 2013 definitively pronounces that customary practices denying 
women equal access to property cannot stand. As Chief Justice Ian Kirby proclaimed: “Any 
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customary law or rule which discriminates in any case against a woman unfairly, solely on 
the basis of her gender would not be in accordance with humanity, morality or natural 
justice” (Mmusi v. Ramantele, 2012).  Such a sentiment is the preoccupation of the Zambian 
courts as well.  This paper examines how the structure of the Zambian constitution and 
judiciary allows for the continued discrimination against women in customary law and 
explores why the repugnancy clause is rarely used. We then highlight the legal strategy 
employed by Botswana to prevent women’s continued subjugation as a possible way 
forward for Zambia. Ultimately, we argue that any substantive improvement in the 
treatment of Zambian women under customary law must involve both a clear decree from 
government and the education of Local Court Magistrates (LCMs). 
 
2. Constitution and International Protocols 
 
Since 1991, Zambia has incorporated anti-gender discrimination provisions into its 
Constitution. Article 23, Clause 1 of the Constitution (1991) pertains to anti-discrimination, 
stating that: “a law shall not make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in 
its effect” (Constitution of Zambia, art. XXIII, cl.1). Discrimination is defined in the article as 
“affording different treatment to different persons attributable, wholly, or mainly to their 
respective descriptions by race, tribe, sex, place of origin, marital status, political opinions, 
colour or creed” (Constitution of Zambia, art. XXIII, cl.1). However, this anti-discrimination 
clause is limited in its application by Section 4(d) of the same article, which states that 
Clause 1 does not apply to the practice of customary law. As a result, Article 23(4)(d) 
greatly hinders the judiciary’s ability to mould customary law to accommodate prevailing 
gender equality movements.  
Internationally, Zambia has signed a variety of treaties that promote women’s 
rights, including the Beijing Platform for Action and African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights (Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties - Zambia, 2009). Nevertheless, 
there is a significant problem in enforcing international legislation due to Zambia’s 
following of a dualist common law doctrine. Under this system: “ratified international 
treaties do not form part of domestic law” (United Nations Entity, 1995). Zambia considers 
itself unobligated to follow international provisions unless those provisions have been first 
incorporated into domestic law. Accordingly, individuals cannot bring suit pertaining to a 
breach of international treaties if that policy is not reflected in domestic law. Because 
current domestic law, primarily Article 23(4)(d), allows certain forms of discrimination, 
international protocols are ineffective in tackling issues of discrimination against women. 
As of 2013, none of these treaties have been entered into law (Ratification of International 
Human Rights Treaties - Zambia, 2009). 
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2.1 Repugnancy Clause 
 
The repugnancy clause acts to define the boundary between two legal systems, ensuring 
that statutory law supersedes customary law where the two conflict. In theory, the 
repugnancy clause allows customary law to adapt to prevailing values in Zambian society. 
In the event that written law does not conflict with a section of customary law, customary 
law is allowed to exist as long as a judge does not find it repugnant to natural justice or 
morality. A particular custom must first be formally challenged in court to be declared 
repugnant (Munalula, July 2013). Although the repugnancy clause exists to reconcile 
customary and statutory law, it is rarely, if ever invoked. It is therefore unsuccessful in 
promoting justice and reducing gender discrimination. Reasons for the clause's lack of 
success include its inherent vagueness, the lack of training in clause implementation among 
LCMs, personal subjectivity from society’s perception of women and history’s designation 
of repugnancy as a colonial instrument.  
 
2.1.2 Vagueness in wording of the clause 
 
Zambia’s judiciary is composed of five sections: the Supreme Court, the High Court, the 
Industrial Relations Court, the Subordinate Courts and the Local Courts. The lowest level of 
courts is the Local Courts, whose jurisdiction lies exclusively in customary law. Section 
12(1)(a) of the Local Courts Act (1966) contains the repugnancy clause, stating that: “Local 
Courts shall administer the African customary law applicable to any matter before it insofar 
as such law is not repugnant to natural justice or morality or incompatible with the 
provisions of any written law”. Both provisions of the repugnancy clause are considerably 
vague and ambiguous. The first provision does not define the terms natural justice or 
morality, while the second provision fails to clarify the degree to which written law must 
be contradicted to be repugnant. The dilemma is aggravated by unclear guidelines over 
which system of morality, African or English, to use in the application of the clause. The 
Local Courts Handbook, a guide given to LCMs, defines natural justice as a streamlined and 
fair means to determine guilt and retribution. The Handbook defines morality as a “sense of 
rightness or decency”, and defines repugnancy to morality as “anything which offends 
[this] or is contrary to fundamental human rights” (Masupelo, 1996). There are no 
examples clarifying when the “natural justice or morality” provision of the repugnancy 
clause should be used. Further contributing to this confusion is the Supreme Court’s failure 
to establish a legal standard for repugnancy. Several LCMs interviewed expressed that they 
award child custody based on customary law, though Zambia’s High Court has awarded 
custody based on the child’s “best interests” in the case Nkomo vs. Tshili (1973) (Amaechi & 
Mildner, 2013). The vagueness in the clause is such that it can be applied either narrowly to 
only the most egregious violations, or broadly to prevent any perceived injustice or 
immorality.  
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2.1.2 Lack of Training among LCMs 
 
The lack of training provided to LCMs additionally contributes to the ineffective application 
of the repugnancy clause. Before appointment to the bench, LCMs are not required to have 
prior legal experience and are not interviewed as to their understanding of customary or 
statutory law (Muma, July 2013). Rather than focusing on judicial knowledge, LCMs are 
hired for their diverse life experiences, respect within their local communities and their 
ability to be impartial. According to the Director of Local Courts, LCMs base their decisions 
in practical experience and conscience, referring to an assessor when necessary (Muma, 
July 2013). LCMs undergo two weeks of training, during which they are given a copy of the 
Local Courts Act as well as the Local Courts Handbook. They are additionally encouraged to 
attend post-training workshops, many of which are sponsored by NGOs. However, lack of 
funding often prevents the dissemination of training materials, as well as opportunities to 
attend the workshops. In the small sample of Local Courts visited in Lusaka, only one of six 
magistrates interviewed was able to produce a copy of the Handbook (Amaechi & Mildner, 
2013). In addition, the Handbook is rarely updated to reflect prevailing international 
human rights norms and contains little guidelines as to what could qualify as a repugnant 
practice (Munsaka, July 2013). With little access to handbooks, funds to attend workshops 
or written guidelines on what qualifies as a repugnant practice, magistrates are limited in 
their knowledge of how to apply the repugnancy clause. To address this problem, the 
Director of the Local Courts stated that the judiciary is organizing a pilot course with 30 
LCMs to educate magistrates on human rights issues, which will include usage of the 
repugnancy clause (Muma, July 2013).  Because there are few programs in place to train 
LCMs on statutory law, many are unsure as to what the boundaries of their jurisdiction are 
or when to apply the repugnancy clause (Munsaka, July 2013). For example, when 
interviewed, all LCMs agreed that the act of sexual cleansing was repugnant. When asked 
why it was repugnant, however, no LCM interviewed specifically cited case law or the Anti-
Gender-Based Violence Act as the impetus. Even though the LCMs’ rulings do not conflict 
with written statutes in this case, their lack of training about statutory law poses 
dangerous implications if they are unaware of a conflict between their judgment and 
written law. The effects resulting from LCMs’ inadequate training about statutory law are 
exacerbated by the fact that: “there are almost no meaningful appeals from the Local Courts 
on customary law cases due to the practical necessity for an advocate in the higher courts” 
since “more than 80% of Zambians who go to Local Courts on issues of customary law 
generally cannot afford an advocate” (Review of Local Court System, 2006). Consequently, 
the magistrates who have the least amount of legal training in the judicial hierarchy often 
make the final decision in determining access to justice for women. 
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2.1.3 Gender Imbalance of LCMs 
 
The gender of the Magistrates influences their personal subjectivity. Men, especially in the 
rural areas, are more encouraged than females to attain education. While there is parity in 
education until grade one, this equality drops off after grade seven, right before secondary 
school begins (Mwale, July 2013). To meet the requirements for becoming an LCM, an 
applicant must have completed at least Grade 12. The disparity in gender ratios at the 
secondary school level means that men are more likely to be considered for an LCM 
position. As of 2013, over 77% of appointed LCMs are male (Chipende, July 2013). At the 
traditional courts or village-level proceedings not formally recognised by the government, 
a sample of 268 traditional rulers similarly found that over 80% were male (Kerrigan et al., 
2012). This finding is especially significant considering that the majority of LCMs indicated 
deferring to traditional rulers in their decisions (Kerrigan et al., 2012).  Ndulo (2011) 
points out the danger in men’s overrepresentation in these positions, stating that: “such 
men are more inclined to defend what they see as traditional norms than the living law of 
communities”. Thus, personal subjectivity on the basis of gender inhibits 
progressivism. Though the overrepresentation of men as LCMs creates a risk of continued 
discrimination towards women, merely increasing the number of female LCMs would not 
necessarily decrease this possibility. Our interviews with female LCMs revealed similar 
gendered attitudes to their male counterparts, rather than advocating for women’s 
expanded rights in customary law. Many LCMs, regardless of gender, were found to have a 
conservative outlook on customary law and rule in favour of maintaining customary legal 
norms. As such, some LCMs are reluctant to rule in a liberal manner that would challenge 
customary norms, resulting in inconsistent interpretations of the repugnancy clause. This 
inconsistency was revealed in several interviews with LCMs who denounced 
discrimination but felt as if their “hands were tied” in giving deference to customary 
law. Despite this ambiguity, the Senior Local Court Officer stated that the clause should 
always be used to prevent customary practices that discriminate against women 
(Chipende, July 2013). However, without any directive on the use of the repugnancy clause 
from a higher court or government authority, it is unlikely that the repugnancy clause will 
be applied uniformly to prevent continued discrimination against women in customary 
law.   
 
2.2 History of the Repugnancy Clause 
 
The conservative application of the repugnancy clause dates back to colonial history. The 
British instituted the repugnancy provision to ensure that customary law would be 
respected, but that English common law would always take precedence if the two systems 
came into conflict (Ndulo, 2011). In Zimbabwe, English colonial rulers did not give “blanket 
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recognition” to customary law, which allowed for practices such as the killing of twins, trial 
by ordeal and non-consensual marriage (Bennett, 1981). Courts found such customs 
“obviously immoral” and adapted their application of the clause to that standard (Bennett, 
1981). Therefore, even though there is the potential for the clause to be applied more 
expansively due to its broad wording, interviews at the Boma and Chelstone Local Courts 
reveal that LCMs have sustained a conservative approach. This approach is exemplified in 
the case of polygamy. While courts did not rule polygamy itself to be repugnant, they have 
found taking on extra wives solely for the sake of sexual slavery or forced labour to be 
repugnant (Longwe, July 2013). The clause’s British origin has further reinforced the 
conservative application of the clause, as: “it has been regarded as a white man’s tool of 
looking down on African customs and tradition” (ZLDC, 2006). LCMs may be reluctant to 
use the clause if they believe it will “westernize” their traditions (ZLDC, 2006). 
Besides its conservative application, another legacy of the repugnancy clause 
includes its propagation of gender discrimination. Because the repugnancy clause was 
introduced by a colonial power with many patriarchal practices in its legal system, these 
biases have been carried over in the implementation of the clause. While the colonial courts 
ruled that woman-to-woman marriage was repugnant, practices such as polygamy 
remained “untouched” (Ndulo, 2011).  Ndulo proposes that this patriarchal approach 
ironically set a precedent to strike down provisions that empowered women (Ndulo, 
2011). This history may explain why the interviewed LCMs who were familiar with the 
repugnancy clause readily acknowledged that customary law was discriminatory towards 
women, but insisted it was not the place of the clause to correct this injustice.   
 In sum, vagueness in wording, lack of training amongst the LCMs, personal 
subjectivity, and the colonial origin of the clause substantially contribute to its sparse usage 
at the Local Court level. These prevailing issues in the Local Court make it unlikely that the 
repugnancy clause will be used to invalidate discriminatory customary laws. Zambia is 
bound to fall behind in the global advancement of women’s rights if it does not address 
these factors, which may require an overhaul of the current judicial structure.  
 
2.3 Equal Protection Legal Strategy  
 
Botswana shows promise in closing the gap between men and women under customary 
law. Botswana’s constitution, similar to Article 23(4) of Zambia’s constitution, exempts 
customary law from review in discriminatory matters while providing for a repugnancy 
provision (Constitution of Botswana, art. XV, cl.4). However, when confronting a 
discrimination case based on customary law, the Botswana High Court relied on the equal 
protection clause, rather than the repugnancy clause, to make the ruling. Specifically, the 
Botswana High Court struck down a discriminatory customary inheritance law ruling that 
prevented women from inheriting property in the case Mmusi v. Ramantele (2012).  
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The ruling in Mmusi held that women had the right to inherit familial property, 
regardless of a customary tradition giving male relatives the sole right to property. The 
judge held that equal protection rights are “independent of the right to non-
discrimination”, and are therefore not subject to exemption (Customary Law).  In this 
decision, the judge referenced the primacy given to equal protection rights throughout the 
world, citing decisions in South Africa, India, the United States, and the United Kingdom.   
The provision relied upon in Mumsi is also present in Zambia’s constitution. While 
Zambia has not yet used the equal protection clause to shield litigants from customary 
law’s discriminatory exemption, it remains a potential legal strategy for Zambia. Equal 
protection argument, akin to Botswana warrants consideration and analysis in the Zambian 
context, however, such discussion is beyond the scope of this article.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Considering the developments in other Southern African countries, it remains to be seen 
how Zambia’s courts will respond to the challenge of providing equal rights for women. 
Moreover, it remains to be seen if Zambia’s current constitutional review process will 
preserve the customary law exception to discrimination. However, it is critical to 
emphasize that a response from the statutory courts or elimination of Article 23(4)(d) in 
the constitution is inconsequential without the training and oversight of LCMs to 
implement non-discriminatory rulings at the community level. The personal nature and 
high volume of cases brought before the Local Courts leave LCMs with the heaviest 
responsibility to ensure gender equality for Zambian women. 
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